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Normality-Toward a Meaningful Construct 
By PAUL C. HORTON 
The condition of alienation, of being asleep, of being 
unconscious, of being out of one’s mind, is the condition 
of the normal man.-R. D. Laing 
T HE TERM “NORMAL” has become, if it has not already been, a liability to the special language of adult psychiatry. Despite the shaky foundation 
supporting the use of this term, it is frequently leaned upon as though it 
designated one of the pillars of psychiatric thought. This paper explores the 
need for and the neglect of the scientific underpinnings which the widespread 
employment of the term would seem to presume, and it reports research 
showing that mental health professionals use the term in a way which allows 
them to assess and label specific behaviors. This usage is unfortunate in that 
the term “normal” does not designate a valid construct, nor is there a relevant 
scientifically meaningful body of psychiatric knowledge from which to Proceed 
in developing an empirically sound construct. It is suggested that much detour 
research is in order. The appropriate direction of that research is explored. 
THE PROS AND CONS OF RESEARCHING NORMALITY 
In recent years, subsequent to Offer and Sabshin’s interesting text,’ there 
has been a circumscribed, insurgent interest in the psychiatric literature re- 
garding the status of the concept, normality. This interest is “insurgent” because 
the message of the normality seekers is that the psychiatric establishment has 
been going down a primrose lane in its thinking about what is “normal” and 
that “For the next decade the greatest need . . . involves the collection of 
empirical data regarding multiple populations studied by multiple techniques.“2 
This interest is “circumscribed” in that the normality research is the product 
of only a handful of workers. The alleged traditional psychiatric approach 
(“normality” as the absence of disease”) is attacked as being scientifically, 
heuristically, and philosophically unpalatable. Defining something by what it 
is not illustrates, in this case, a methodology which Kaplan refers to as the 
“Drunkard’s Search: The drunkard who dropped his door key at his door 
searches for it at the street comer, ‘because’, he explains, ‘it’s lighter there’.“3 
Normality is, in Kaplan’s opinion, a “topic of neglect.“3 Sabshin asserts:2 
“ 
. . . there are very few psychiatric or psychoanalytic studies of normative adult 
behavior.” These opinions are relevant in view of Taft’s conclusion that “The 
main attributes of the ability to judge others seem to lie in three areas: 
possessing appropriate judgmental norms, judging ability and motivation. 
Where J is similar in background to S, he has the advantage of being able 
to use appropriate norms for making his judgment.“4 (Italics, mine.) 
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The normality insurgents argue that a scientifically meaningful normality 
construct can provide a baseline by reference to which diagnostic and thera- 
peutic efficacy can be assessed. Typical of these pleas is that of Hollingshead 
and Redlich: 
Unfortunately, psychiatry lacks a standard of what is normal and what is abnormal. 
A standard measure of normality and abnormality would enable researchers to deter- 
mine the presence or absence of mental illness in a population. It also might enable 
them to estimate the proneness of some persons to mental illness. In sum, the lack of 
criteria for dividing the sick from the well presents great obstacles to investigators who 
desire to make studies of incidence or prevalence of mental illness.“j 
Taft’s findings suggest that a normality construct is a necessary condition for 
the valid assessment of diagnostic and therapeutic efficacy and the determina- 
tion of population base rates. It is further reasoned that validation of other 
theoretical constructs will be facilitated by reference to a standard of nor- 
mality. And, finally, it is claimed that there is some configuration of traits, of 
behavioral patterns which can be objectively identified and to which the term 
“normal” can be felicitously affixed. This latter claim is especially relevant to 
the proponents of community psychiatry. An expeditious formula for determin- 
ing the relative normality of an applicant or client would be of tremendous 
dispositional utility in the booming community mental health business. 
From the patient’s viewpoint as well, the concept of normal is quite im- 
portant. Stanton and Schwartz point out: “This concept of ‘normal’, and the 
implied promise of everything that a patient may imagine as included in it, 
is the dominant conscious organizing factor in what a patient does in the 
hospital.“6 In addition, the majority of outpatients I have evaluated or treated, 
have raised questions about their own “normality” or about the sort of 
“normality” they might find in the course of the treatment. 
In spite of the cogent arguments in favor of the generation of a scientifically 
valid construct, there are several reasons why such a construct has not been 
widely pursued. Sabshin has spoken of the “resistance”7 he has encountered 
in trying to demonstrate the need for a meaningful concept. Kaplan has 
implied with his “Drunkards Search” analogy that a kind of mistaken expedi- 
tiousness underlies its neglect. I have encountered another serious objection to 
the pursuit of “normality.” This objection is a “resistance” of sorts but occurs 
at a cognitive level. This is what one might call the “intuitive” objection. The 
argument goes something like this: “Based on my clinical experience, I know 
what ‘normal’ is and therefore, researching normality is a waste of time.” A 
more general way of stating this position is to say that one can have true 
convictions which one cannot prove for practical or theoretical reasons, and 
that failure to offer proof for these convictions does not mean that the con- 
victions are unsound. 
It is logically correct, of course, that failure to objectively validate a con- 
viction does not render the conviction invalid, and if one combines this premise 
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with a rare skill such as that spoken of by Socrates in The Republic, one is 
perhaps justified in being neglectful of scrutinizing his impressions and con- 
victions: “My own case of the internal sign is hardly worth mentioning for 
rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been given to any other man.“s However, 
there is evidence to indicate that the majority of us must be more circumspect 
about our “intuitive” knowledge. (See also reference 9.) Taft demonstrates the 
danger in adopting the “intuitive” principle as a modus operandi in judging 
others: “Luft compared the ability of clinicians (psychiatrists, psychologists, 
and social workers), graduate students, and physical science students on a 
series of tests in which they were required to predict the responses of indi- 
viduals to objective and projective test items. The physical scientists were 
superior to all the other J’s on the tasks taken as a whole.“4 It is no wonder 
that Holsopple and Phelan call for a de-emphasis of pathological stereotypes 
and a devotion of more time “to building up stable internal norms of the 
personality patterns to be found among well-functioning people.“l” One 
might conclude that the other side of the normality conviction coin is that 
the strength of a conviction does not render the conviction apriori true. 
PSYCHIATRIC CONCEPTIONS OF NORMALITY 
The lack of an objective data-base for a truly meaningful normality con- 
struct has not prevented psychiatrists from speculating about its meaning. 
Normality as the absence of disease has been described as the ‘traditional” 
psychiatric approach. 2 Many psychoanalysts think of normality as an ideal 
state, a kind of mental utopia or as an end-product of successful psychoanal- 
ysis. Still other psychiatrists are seen to conceptualize normal as the 
simplistic average. a The latter notion may carry a distinctly negative loading. 
Laing says for example: “What we call ‘normal’ is a product of repression, 
denial, splitting, projection, introjection and other forms of destructive action 
on experience . . . It is radically estranged from the structure of being.“ll 
The word “normal” is derived from the Latin word “normalis” which 
means “according to rule.“‘2 This seems paradoxical in that there are so 
many and diverse rules governing its usage that it often appears as though 
there were no rules at all. Stromgren has observed: “Psychiatry has . . . 
often been accused of indulging in terms and concepts, frequently even in 
terms without conceptsn13 His remark seems especially apropos to the 
psychiatric use of “normal.” 
As one peruses these stylized notions, one is struck by two ubiquitous 
features. Firstly, as has been frequently lamented, the various notions of 
normality are value-ridden. In many cases the notions are little more than 
personal biases. Such qualities as “adequate self-knowledge,” and “adequate 
life goals”14 exemplify these funded opinions. The second striking feature 
is that they are so vague and general that their application would seem to 
be unfeasible. The employment of these often conflicting and personalized 
notions by community psychiatrists would certainly lead to much stylized 
counter-transference abuse. 
It is interesting that although the psychiatric literature on normality 
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abounds with literary conceptions, there is little or no evidence that these 
notions are capable of being employed when psychiatrists are confronted 
with specific behaviors or situations. It is claimed, however, that many 
psychiatrists have “funded meanings” or “tacit conceptualizations”3 of nor- 
mality. If psychiatrists carry with them “funded meanings” of normality for 
which there is no reasonably objective data-base, it seems cruical for this 
to be known. Excess conceptual baggage, especially of the opinionated 
sort, should be discarded by us in the same way that physicists have done 
away with such notions as “ether,” for which no objective validity could be 
shown. In keeping with this, research carried on at the University of 
Michigan Hospital addressed itself to whether or not psychiatric residents at 
all stages of training through the fifth year have ideas about normality which 
are capable of being emptooyed in a vey specific wag. 
SUBJECTS AND METHODS 
In the fall of 1967, forty-seven University of Michigan psychiatric residents, ranging 
in training from first to fifth years, were asked to evaluate how they thought a “typical 
normal person” would respond in a variety of situations contrived to engender anxiety, 
hostility, generosity, satisfaction and candor as described in a 48 item questionnaire. An 
example of one of the items follows: a typical normal person is called a “stupid idiot” by 
his boss in front of the entire office staff. The boss calls him this over a mistake that the 
boss himself has made. 
I I I I I I L I 1 
not you would mild rn”CI, ym> 
at bf annoyed anger Ll”gZF lTUl<l 
Cl11 hut would -lCXbl<i -You n,rde ,- 
forget the “OiCC WO” ld rile 
59,01e ?OUr quit I”,.55 
Lhl”2 B”::eT your ,nlr 
Thirty-one (66%) of the residents returned completed questionnaires. Ten of 11 came 
from first year residents; nine of 14 from second year residents; seven of ten from third 
year residents; four of nine from fourth year residents; and one of three from fifth year 
residents. Fifty-seven Ypsilanti State Hospital “schizophrenics” were also surveyed as a 
comparison group. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
A distribution of the responses of the residents and schizophrenics on the 
nine point rating scale of the first part of the above item is shown in Fig. 1. 
The resident’s responses ranged from “annoyed but decides to forget the 
whole thing” through “much anger-quits his job.” This variance was 
characteristic of virtually all of the item response distributions. 
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Fig. l.-Distribution of responses to item No. 30 of questionnaire. The horizontal 
represents points on the rating scale. 
The last item read as follows: 
In this item it was assumed that the absence-of disease perspective of 
normality is actually a subcategory of the normality-as-ideal perspective. 
A distribution of the responses of the residents and schizophrenics appears 
in Fig. 2. 
There are three significant findings of this study: (1) The majority (66%) 
of residents asked to participate in this study demonstrated that they had 
an idea of “normal” which they were willing to employ and which allowed 
them to categorize behavior in very specific situations; (2) The residents 
showed remarkable inter-resident variability (as the above graph illustrates) 
in their ideas about the “typical normaI person”; (3) The majority of the 
residents consciously defined their notions of normality as being a hybrid of 
the normality-as-average and normality-as-ideal perspectives. This latter 
finding is important in that the current stylized literary notions of normality 
do not include a hybird notion. It is interesting that pilot research at the 
University of Michigan into the in-practice rule of sort (as contrasted with 
literary rules of sort or self-reports about how one sorts out normal behavior) 
has yielded results suggesting that the rule of sort is extraordinarily complex. 
Preliminary data indicate that the rule of sort for an individual psychiatrist 
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Fig. 2.-Distribution of responses to item No. 48 on questionnaire illustrating the 
subjects range of ideas about “normality.” 
is actually a complex of rules working concurrently. Furthermore, these 
rules interact with the sort of behavior in question, thus adding a new 
dimension of complexity. To caricaturize the situation, the stylized notions 
of normality in vogue in the literature probably bear about as much sem- 
blance to how and what the individual psychiatrist thinks about normality 
as a Hollywood movie does to real life. 
The meaning of the failure of 16 psychiatric residents to return completed 
questionnaires cannot be stated with certainty. No harassments or induce- 
ments were employed in attempting to obtain a 100 per cent return. 
Several of the nonresponders stated that they did not regard “typical normal 
person” as a meaningful category. The remaining nonresponders offered no 
reason for failing to fill out the somewhat lengthy questionnaire. 
THEPRESENTDATA-BASE AND REZEARCHSTRATEGIJZS 
Unfortunately, research in the name of “normality” has yet to be productive 
of potentially integratable data. Consider the following data about the 
“normal” woman (normal as average) gathered by Michigan State University’s 
consumer marketing program:15 She walks about 8 miles a day to do errands; 
she has trouble sleeping and 40 per cent of her isomnia is caused by “worry,” 
30 per cent of her worries are about things she can not do anything about, 
and 20 per cent are relatively unimportant; when she dreams she likes to 
remember the social function at which she met her husband and when he 
proposed to her. Compare these data with what Offer has to say about 
“normal” adolescents: “During the freshman year, among the small groups 
that dated actively, kissing and necking were the prominent way of express- 
ing affection . . . Less than 10% had sexual intercourse by the end of the 
junior year. No subject admitted participating in overt homosexual behavior. 
Lastly, we would like to add that 80% of the subjects confided in us that 
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they approved of premarital sexual intercourse, but only after high school. 
The main conscious reason that the teenagers gave for not engaging in 
sexual intercourse in high school was fear that the girl would get pregnant.“l’ 
Offer’s data and the Michigan State University data have in common the 
stamp of marketing research. If one were marketing sex, Offer’s data might 
be helpful. It is difficult, however, to understand the relationship between 
the percentage of teenages who admit to homosexual relations and the 
generation of a construct of “normal” adolescent sexual behavior. There are 
three reasons why this appears to be a futile approach. The first is that the 
normative values of Offer’s parameters are too culture, class and time bound. 
Even if we knew what teenages do sexually, as contrasted with knowing 
what they say they do, extensive normative research would have to be 
undertaken every few months or years in order to keep the norms up to 
date. Contrast the temporal stability of the normative values of intelligence 
test parameters with the probable temporal stability of the normative values 
of Offer’s parameters. A scrupulous effort has been made in the construction 
of intelligence tests to minimize and eliminate, where possible, faddish 
elements. Offer, however, seems to be derogating the normality construct 
to a kind of “who-says-they-do-what-when” status. 
A second defect of the Offer approach resides in the method with which 
data is collected. “Conscious” reasons given by teenagers (or any age-grouping 
for that matter) regarding their sexual behavior may be far from real reasons. 
The L, F, and K scales on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
were devised out of the realization that what people say about what they 
do or think may be quite different from what they actually do or think. The 
L and K scales were devised to detect gross and subtle dissimulation, re- 
spectively. The F scale is elevated “whenever a subject does not answer with 
discrimination because of inability to read and understand well enough . . .” 
or when direct carelessness, or carelessness with intent to confuse the data” 
is involved.17 Scientifically sp eaking, it is not enough for a researcher to say 
“I just had the feeling they were telling the truth.” Besides the possibility 
of deliberate falsification, this stance ignores the whole province of defense- 
psychology. From an armchair perspective, one wonders, for example, if 
it is even remotely plausible for a virtual stranger, representing the establish- 
ment, who “cannot gratify longings for understanding and help”16 to query 
teenagers about “overt homosexual behavior” with the expectation that they 
will be able and willing to be candid. Ordinarily, the admission of painfully 
guilt-ridden acts is predicated upon the formation of a therapeutic alliance. 
Even when a therapeutic alliance has been formed, however, defenses such 
as denial, projection, and rationalization may have to be worked through 
before the therapist obtains a valid perspective about what has happened to 
the patient. The stereoscopic therapeutic technique wherein spouses are 
treated by therapists who compare notes can provide a startling awakening 
to the psychiatrist who assumes that he is “getting the picture” from his 
single source of information. The Offer approach appears to be productive 
of a hodge-podge collection of data of dubious veracity. 
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The third defect of the Offer study is that the parameters researched hold 
no promise for the establishment of Zuws of normal behavior. TO attempt 
to create a normality construct by asking what percentage of high school 
juniors date actively or pet heavily, etc., is rather like trying to invent the 
law of gravity by cataloging the colors of various objects which fall to the 
earth. Cul-de-sac research and ephemeral norms are byproducts of the 
injudicious selection of parameters. 
Besides the ill-selection of parameters there is much left to be desired in 
the logic and reasoning of some of the present research strategies. Shakow,l’ 
for example, commits both logical and assumptive errors. His approach is 
conceptually sophisticated in that he perceives that the definition of a normal 
person may be predicated upon the identification of characteristics which 
make one ineligible for class membership.’ From his study of schizophrenics 
he concludes, for example, that “The normal person habituates easily and 
is relatively free from perseveration. He demonstrates an appropriate balance 
between stability and flexibility, being neither too rigid nor to loose.” Let 
us heed Stamp’s advice and “. . . lay bare the bones of the argument.““0 
Shakow has found inflexibility to be a characteristic of schizophrenic be- 
havior. He concludes from this that the “normal” must be, in some sense, 
flexible. This conclusion is invalid. This is like saying, “Since communists 
are atheists, noncommunists must believe in God.” Let us examine what 
seems to be the step-wise progression of Shakow’s reasoning in order to 
determine where he has erred. Shakow begins with these assumptions: 
(1) if schizophrenic then abnormal; (2) if schizophrenic then inflexible. He 
concludes from these premises: if inflexible then abnormal. Surely, he could 
not have concluded the reverse, that abnormality implies inflexibility, on the 
basis of studying only one subcategory of abnormality. His conclusion that 
inflexibility implies abnormality is, however, invalid. His error is rendered 
transparent by substituting less abstruse terms: ( 1) if communist then atheist; 
(2) if communist then human. Therefore, if human then atheist. The next 
step in the argument is syllogistically valid but begins with a fallaciously 
arrived at premise: (1) if inflexible then abnormal; (2) if inflexible then not 
flexible (3) if abnormal then not normal. Therefore, if normal then flexible. 
His conclusion based, in part, on a premise which was arrived at by specious 
reasoning, is therefore, unacceptable. Shakow makes still another error in 
reasoning. He promises to construct “. . . a theory which provides reasons 
why schizophrenic disturbances do not occur in normal mental functioning.” 
Later, however, he states: “. . , individual and group variability are so great, 
particularily in schizophrenics, that there are bound to be occasional over- 
laps between schizophrenic and normal performances.” This issue of category 
overlap is pivotal. If one is going to make “direct inferences” about “normal” 
from the study of “extreme abnormality” one must be able to clearly identify 
the category into which a particular behavior falls. 
Offer and OffeP commit the fallacy of “begging the question” by 
*See reference i9 for an explication of disjunctive classes. 
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screening “abnormals” out of a study of “modal adolescents.” They assume 
what they are attempting to arrive at through empirical means. “Modal 
adolescent’in this study is at least a misnomer. It is interesting in this con- 
nection that Masterson and Washburnez2 found only 41 of 101 adolescents 
surveyed to be relatively healthy. Given Offer and Offer’s criteria, the “modal 
adolescent” may well be the “abnormal” adolescent. 
The research of Kysarz3 et al also ‘begs the question” in the selection of 
subjects. Kysar et al. “randomly” choose freshman college students from 
“the total population of freshmen admitted to an urban university in Sep- 
tember, 1968.” They refer to their S’s as “ ‘normal’ late adolescents.” They 
seem to be implying that “normal” late adolescence entails being a college 
freshman, There are those who would argue that “normal” late adolescence 
entails being a G.I. in SE. Asia or an unemployed ghetto resident. The 
interaction between the statistical approach which “randomly” selected 
subjects implies, and the utopian approach which the choice of a highly 
select group of Ss implies, compounds the ambiguity which plagues the use 
of the label, “normal.” .a 
The final error which I will call attention to is a result of the failure to 
appreciate the pitfalls of statistical normality. Offer and Offer in their “Profile 
of normal adolescent girls” state: “Suflice it to say here that we define normal 
in the context of this study to mean ‘that which is average.’ This approach 
is based on the mathematical principle of the bell-shaped curve and its ap- 
plicability to physical, psychological and social data.“21 This approach, how- 
ever, is based not so much on a principle as on an assumption. There was 
a standing joke in the University of Minnesota Psychology Department that 
someone had offered a large reward, something like $10,060, for anyone who 
could demonstrate a human psychological trait to be “normally” distributed. 
At last report there were no takers. A recent paper by Elvebackz4 et al. sug- 
gests that there is truth in this anecdote. Elveback et al. measured a number of 
variables in ‘healthy” subjects such as calcium, albumin and phosphate levels. 
Their conclusion was: “The distributions in healthy persons are not gaussian 
for the majority of variables, and the departures from normal may be major.” 
Elveback et al. emphasize that the law of errors is a mathematical theorem, 
not an experimental fact and that “We have no mathematical, statistical or 
other theorems that enable us to predict the shape of the distributions of physi- 
ological measurements.” The same can be said for psychological variables; we 
do not in fact, know the shapes of their distributions and much basic research 
needs to be done in this regard. Conclusions arrived at by the assumption of 
the applicability of this theorem to highly skewed or leptokurtic data will of 
course be invalid. 
Undaunted, Offer and Offer extend the application of the gaussian distribu- 
tion to new horizons: “A modal or typical student was defined as one whose 
answers fell within one standard deviation from the mean in at Ieast nine out 
of ten scales.” Not only do they assume that the individual variables are nor- 
mally distributed, but also that the collective variables are normally distributed 
It is surprising that Offer and Offer would define a “modal” or “typical” 
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student in this fashion because in Normality: Theoretical and Clinical Con- 
cepts of Mental Health’ there is an allusion to the work of Williams 
which suggests that the occurrence of such a “normal” person would be a 
rarity and certainly not ‘modal.” Williams, writing in Biochemical Individu- 
ality, says: “The existence in every human being of a vast array of attributes 
which are potentially measurable . . . and probably uncorrelated mathemati- 
cally, makes quite tenable the hypothesis that practically every human being 
is a deviate in some respects.“25 In support of this hypothesis, Williams offers 
some correlative biological data which shows that one’s chance of being 
“normal” in a number of parameters such as heart size, thyroid activity, etc., 
is only l/6500. Remembering that Offer and OfIer defined their “normal’ 
or “‘typical” student as one whose answers fell within one standard deviation 
of the mean in at least nine out of ten scales, it is possible if not likely, that 
their so-called “modal” student is an anomaly. There is a curious progression 
from a highly select group, to the idea of “modal” group, to “normality.” 
PROPOSAL OF A RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Given that the research designs and parameters researched thus far are 
inadequate, how should the normality seekers proceed? To begin with, it is 
clear that a valid normality construct will be dependent upon the relevant 
surrounding body of data, laws and theory. Data collection is only the first 
step in the generation of a scientifically valid construct. Freud, who appears 
to have been a shrewd philosopher of science despite what his uninformed 
critics may say, attempted an early formulation of construct validity: “No 
conclusions upon the construction and working methods of the mental instru- 
ment can be arrived at or at least fully proved from even the most painstak- 
ing investigation of dreams or any other mental function taken in isolation.” 
More recently Cronbach and MeehP have expanded the notion of construct 
validity: (1) making clear what something is requires a spelling out of the 
LHLX in which the thing occurs and; (2) that at least some of the laws must 
be spelled out in observables. They assert “. . . unless the network (interlock- 
ing system of laws telling what something is)* makes contact with observa- 
tions, and exhibits explicit, public steps of inference, construct validation 
cannot be claimed.” To call a population “normal” simply because one has 
collected data on that population is probably to commit a logical error.’ 
An exception to the latter rule occurs when a researcher simply means 
“average” in using the word “normal.” The Michigan State University consumer 
marketing data is an example of the restricted use of “normal” as “average.” 
These people collected data without regard to the psychiatric implications 
of their work. Their concerns were market-place concerns and they were not 
attempting to generate a valid, scientific construct. If a researcher simply 
means “average” when he says “normal” and implies nothing beyond the 
“Parenthetical statement inserted by author. 
See reference 28 for an explication of the logical error or reification. 
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data, he ought to say “average” and not give the impression that he is 
doing something more meaningful. 
It is clear in any case that we as behavioral scientists will be able to 
validly label a behavior, person or population as “normal” only when we 
have the data, laws, and theory which spell out the construct, “normality.” 
But what of the state of the surrounding body of data, laws and theory 
constituting the science of psychiatry and forming the potential underpinnings 
of a normality construct? Freeman et al. have assessed the state of our 
science as follows: “It has not yet been possible to isolate, measure and 
witness the interaction of forces necessary for the performance of a particular 
mental function.“20 Methodologically and conceptually, psychiatry is a 
nascent science. Consequently, it is difficult to be enthusiastic about a frontal 
assault on what may be the most potentially subtle of all psychiatric concepts. 
As an example of the abundant confusion which can arise when attempting 
a frontal assault on normality in the present day psychiatric framework, let 
us examine Sabshin’? comments about Freudian normality. Sabshin states 
that a functional perspective of normality based on the Freudian “ideal fic- 
tion” concept is an “Orwellian nightmare.” He suggests that there is a “logical 
connection” between the utopian concept of Freud and “computerized regula- 
tion.” This is perplexing because it is inordinately difficult to conceive of 
a nexus between “computerized regulation” and the Freudian theoretical 
framework with its “primary process.” A psychic model embracing an un- 
conscious, mostly irrational element, admitting of near-infinite associations 
and functioning at times irrespectively of stimulus input seems to one to 
pose the opposite problem: the utter infeasibility of prediction and control. 
As Freud has said: “The unconscious is the true psychical reality; in its 
innermost nature it is as much unknown to us as the reality of the external 
world, and it is as incompletely presented by the data of consciousness as 
is the external world by the communications of our sense organs.“2Z 
It would appear, therefore, that detour research is in order. If one believes, 
as I do, that hypothetical constructs are inventions (as distinguished from 
discoveries) whose characers are limited but not determined by the stimulus 
properties of the field under consideration, one is permitted a certain degree 
of arbitrariness in the selection of parameters and frameworks. It is with this 
in mind that I regard the extensive attempts to clarify the meaning and 
develop measurements of a parameter such as anxiety as steps in the direc- 
tion of solving the conceptual and methodological problems which normality 
research raises. Anxiety is an example of a potentially useful construct to 
the normality seeker for several reasons: it is a concept central to psycho- 
logical theory; it refers to a universal phenomenological state (Its form, for 
example, is probably not idiosyncratic to upper middle class suburbanites); 
it refers to an internal state likely to be experienced by people of all ages 
and generations; it holds the promise of being amenable to precise description 
and measurement; it appears to be integratable with sociological, psycho- 
logical and neurophysiological constructs; it does, in short, hold promise for 
the formation of laws of human behavior. The research on anxiety is too 
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massive to review here. Suffice it to say that there have been attempts to 
develop psychological tests of chronic anxiety30 and immediate anxiety.31 
There has been a multitude of attempts to develop physical, autonomic and 
endocrinological correlates of this burgeoning construct. 
Unfortunately, the formation of a “normality” construct based on funda- 
mental parameters of human mentation such as anxiety, hostility, intellection, 
and affection is in the distant future. As Gleser et al. say: “Despite the centrality 
of the concept of anxiety in psychological theory, it is only within the last 
decade that attempts have been made to measure the concept objectively.“31 
For those feeling the presssure of demands for a “community psychiatry” 
the delay may seem too long. There is little choice, however, but to be 
patient. We have, as an alternative, the formation of a hasty and ill-con- 
ceived notion of “normal” which could be easily abused by the individual 
mental health worker or, worse yet, become a weapon in the hands of a 
governing body wishing to stifle deviancy. Indulgence in such a notion could 
we11 transform Sabshin’s “Orwellian nightmare” into an Orwellian reality. 
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